Trust, but Verify
In 1983, Ken Thompson and Dennis Ritchie were awarded the ACM A.M. Turing Award “for their development of generic operating systems theory and specifically for the implementation of the UNIX operating system.” In his acceptance speech, aptly titled “Reflections on Trusting Trust,” Thompson presented a now infamous hypothetical design for a backdoor attack in the C source code compiler that would render login security obsolete and, by its own design, be nearly impossible to detect (if you haven’t read it, I highly recommend taking some time to so, as it is a fascinating read). While Thompson’s speech largely consisted of a detailed explanation of exactly how this attack would work, the moral of his story reflected on the inherent need for trust in the software industry. In his words, “[y]ou can’t trust code that you did not totally create yourself. (Especially code from companies that employ people like me.) No...